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 ABSTRACT 
Dynamic Models of Religious Conformity and Conversion:  Theory and 
Calibrations 
by Oz Shy*
This paper develops behavioral and deterministic overlapping generations 
models to explain and simulate changes in the proportion of secular and 
religious people. Under the behavioral approach, the role of the church is to 
generate an externality associated with the investment in enhancing the 
conformity rate among young believers. Under the deterministic approach, 
changes in the number of nonbelievers are explained by different birth rates 
among secular and religious parents as well as the relative proportion of 
nonconformists among the young in each group. This model is then used to 
calibrate for (non)conformity rates among secular and religious people. 
Keywords:  Conversion, Religious conformity, Role of the Church, Nonconformity, 
Nonreligious people, Religious Affiliation, Parents’ education, Believers, 
Nonbelievers 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Dynamische Modelle religiöser Konformität und Konversion:  Theorie und 
Simulationen 
 
Diese Arbeit entwickelt deterministische und Verhaltensmodelle mit 
überlappenden Generationen, welche die Veränderungen des 
Zahlenverhältnisses von nicht religiösen zu religiösen Menschen erklären und 
simulieren. Im Verhaltensansatz wird aufgezeigt, dass der Kirche die Aufgabe 
zukommt, einen externen Effekt zu erzeugen, der dafür sorgt, dass junge 
Gläubige mit der Glaubenseinstellung ihrer Eltern konform gehen. Der 
deterministische Ansatz erklärt die Veränderungen in der Anzahl Nichtgläubiger 
einerseits mit den unterschiedlichen Geburtenraten unter nichtgläubigen Eltern 
im Vergleich zu religiösen Eltern und andererseits durch den relativen Anteil von 
Nichtkonformen unter der jungen Generation in jeder Gruppe. Dieses Modell 
wird verwandt, um (Nicht-)Konformitätsraten – nach denen junge Menschen 
ihren Eltern im Glauben folgen oder nicht - innerhalb der Gruppen weltlicher 
sowie religiöser Menschen zu berechnen. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Sociologists are divided among themselves as to whether people have become more religious
or less religious over the past 200 years (the so called “secularization paradigm”). On one
hand the observed resurgence of evangelical Christianity in the United States, the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the rapid growth of Protestantism in Latin America
may create an impression that parts of the world are drifting away from secular beliefs. On the
other hand, as we further discuss below, one should be very careful in interpreting the above
observations since they do not conﬂict with other observations showing a clear rise in those who
consider themselves as nonreligious (secular people in what follows).
The secularization paradigm postulates a decline in the social power of religion. Earlier
and much stronger interpretations of this paradigm included a view that religions may cease
to appeal to the masses with the advance in technologies, communication, and the process of
democratization. These views are discussed by Sociology scholars such as Wilson (1966) and
Martin (1978) among others. For the purpose of this paper, however, I limit the interpretation
of this paradigm to imply only a long-term increase in both the absolute and relative numbers of
nonreligious secular people in given societies.1 Of course, even under this narrow interpretation,
the rise in the number of secular people (or simply people who lose their interest in all aspects
of religion) may also be be associated with a decline in the extent to which people engage in
religious practices.
As noted by Stark and Bainbridge (1985), social scientists have misread the future of reli-
gion partly because they erroneously equated religion with a particular set of organizations. The
secularization paradigm, which has relied on a “reduction-in-demand” argument, has been chal-
lenged since the mid-1980s by “market-oriented” and supply-side theories, see for example Stark
1In fact, it should be mentioned right from the start that this paper is not about “secularization” in the broad
sense of this term, since the process of secularization may be referred to the process of deepening the separation
of church and state. That is, paradoxically under this broad deﬁnition, separation of church and state may be
supported even by strongly religious people.
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and Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark (1992), and Stark and Iannaccone (1994). This line
of thinking postulates that humankind will always need religion.2 Thus, if one form of religion
declines, another one should take its place. That is, the supply-side argument focuses on the rise
and fall of religious institutions and organizations. In this line of thinking, Stark and Iannaccone
(1994) argue that supply-side weaknesses, ineﬃcient religious organizations, and highly-regulated
economies explain the secularization of many European nations.
It should be pointed out that sociologists still continue to strongly disagree among themselves
on the applicability of the secularization paradigm. Not only do they disagree on the theory,
but amusedly they also disagree on how to interpret the data. Bruce (2002) challenges the
interpretation of the data used by those who oppose the secularization paradigm and supplies a
large number of counter facts supporting long-run increases in the number of secular people. On
p.43 he writes:
“...while the proportion of atheists in a population is an interesting secondary indicator
(as it is steadily increasing in the West), it is not a primary test. ...I see the popularity
of religious belief as a useful index of secularization. I expect the proportion of people
who are largely indiﬀerent to religious ideas to increase and the seriously religious to
become a small minority.”
The goal of the present paper is to model, explain, and simulate changes in the proportion
of secular and religious people in a society. Religious aﬃliations are commonly observed in any
society, across all continents, and cut through all nations with all levels of per-capita income. The
formation of the various secular groups received much less attention in the literature. This paper
attempts to close this gap by explicitly modeling the transition (conversion) of people between
the religious and the secular groups. The paper constructs a testable overlapping-generations
model in which young can always choose whether adhere to their parents belief (secular versus
2Under this approach, the demand for religion stems from essentially the scarcity of rewards, which puts people
on the market searching for compensators. Since religion is able to invoke the supernatural, religion is superior
to secular philosophies and therapies in the supply of such compensators. Hence, the demand for religion should
be high and stable over time.
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religious), or whether to switch (convert) to the other group of believers or nonbelievers. The
model computes the dynamic paths of the fraction of secular and religious people in a society.
The resulting equilibrium paths of secular and religious people in a society are characterized as
a function of two parameters sets: The birth rates and the proportion of conformists within
each group. Conformists tend to adopt their parents’ aﬃliation (secular versus religious) whereas
nonconformists convert against their parents’ belief. Thus, a marriage that results in a conversion
against a person’s parental belief is also captured by nonconformism in our model. In addition,
this paper analyzes the foundation of (non)conformism from religious perspectives, and calibrates
the model for these parameters.
A secondary goal of this paper is to develop a behavioral approach to conversion by introducing
parents who can invest in “proper” education for the purpose of increasing the probability of
conformity among their children. I show that the church plays an important role in creating an
asymmetry between religious education and secular education, since church education generates
an externality that enhances the conformity rate, as compared with privately-ﬁnanced education.
1.2 Deﬁnitions
Secular people form a highly disparate group and not a single religion. Atheists are a small subset
of this grouping that actually makes up less than one-tenth of one percent of the population in
many countries in which large numbers claim no religious preference, such as the United States.
Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) suggest the following deﬁnitions.
Nonreligious: Persons professing no religion, no interest in religion; secularists, materialists,
agnostics, but not militantly antireligious or atheists.
Atheists: Militantly anti-religious or anti-Christian agnostics, secularists, or marxists.
Nonreligionists: Term encompassing the two varieties of unbelievers: (a) agnostics or secularists
or nonreligious materialists who are not hostile to religion, and (b) atheists or anti-religious
militantly opposed or hostile to religion.
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In view of these deﬁnitions, this paper analyzes the evolution of nonreligionists, since it combines
all groups of nonbelievers. For the sake of simplicity, I will be using the terms secular people,
nonbelievers, and nonreligious people to mean nonreligionists.
1.3 Data
Table 1 presents aggregate percentage of secular people out of the total population in ﬁve conti-
nents (averaged from individual countries). Table 1 clearly indicates a rising trend in the propor-
Continent 1900 1970 1990 1995 2000 2025
Africa: 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9
Asia: 0.0 25.0 21.0 20.4 19.8 12.6
Europe: 0.5 21.3 18.7 18.2 17.8 14.7
L. America: 0.6 2.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.2
N. America: 1.2 4.7 9.0 9.4 9.7 12.9
Table 1: Percentage of secular people (nonreligious and atheists combined).
Source: Data prossessed from the World Christian Encyclopedia.
tion of people classiﬁed as secular, which was negligibly small at the turn of the 20th Century.
As indicated in this table, some Asian countries experience a relative decline in secularization
as more people convert to Christianity. Some decline is also observed in Europe, partly because
of the increase in the number of member countries, some of which are dominated by Catholic
believers. Finally, Africa and Latin America have the lowest percentage of secular people.
Table 2 displays somewhat more detailed data for a sample of countries. Table 2 reveals
that atheists form a small fraction of secular people regardless of whether the fraction of secular
people is high or low among the entire population of the country. This is because atheism is
considered to be an extreme belief even among nonbelievers. In this sample of countries, the
percentage of atheists grows at a much smaller rate than the percentage of nonreligious people
who are not atheists. Unlike the data on the ﬁve continents displayed in Table 1, here the sampled
countries exhibit a fast (generally accelerating) growth in the rate of secular people (atheists and
nonreligious combined).
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Country 1900 1970 1990 1995 2000 2025
A N A N A N A N A N A N
Argentina: 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.7 2.9 0.7 2.2 0.8 2.3 0.8 3.4
Australia: 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.9 0.8 6.4 0.8 6.8 0.8 6.8 1.0 8.6
England: 0.0 1.9 0.5 7.9 1.3 11.3 1.3 11.6 1.4 11.8 1.7 13.5
Germany: 0.1 0.2 2.5 7.1 2.2 16.8 2.2 17.1 2.2 17.2 1.9 17.6
Spain: 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.8 1.1 4.3 1.1 4.4 1.1 4.6 1.5 5.7
Sweden: 0.1 1.0 9.9 14.8 11.9 17.5 11.9 17.5 11.9 17.5 12.1 18.2
U.S.A.: 0.0 1.3 0.1 4.8 0.3 8.4 0.4 8.7 0.4 9.0 0.5 12.3
Table 2: Percentages of atheists (A) and other nonreligious (N) people among the entire population in
a sample of countries. Source: World Christian Encyclopedia
.
Some sociologists may explain the increase in the number of secular people relative to the
population size by the advance of science and by the introduction of a variety of media that
spreads this information (such as, radio, television, magazines, and lately the powerful Internet).
The present paper argues that the secularization process is somewhat more complicated as it
creates intergenerational conﬂicts, mainly concerning interreligious marriages. For this reason
this paper formulates an overlapping generations model in order to explore the dynamic paths of
secularization on one side, and the magnitude of religious aﬃliation on the other side.
Finally, it is interesting to note that even academic scientists diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their attitude
towards nonreligious and atheist ideas. For example, Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke (1996) report
that in the hard sciences around 27% have no religion and 11% oppose to religion. In contrast,
36% of those in social sciences have no religion and 13% oppose to religion.
1.4 Additional literature
We have already discussed some related literature on conversions. Additional literature includes
Iannaccone (1998), who provides a general literature survey on the economics of religion. Shy
(2001, Ch.11) sketches some static examples on the directions of conversions between two reli-
gions. Montgomery (1996) is perhaps the closest to the present research. In his dynamic model,
conformity is generated by “religious capital” which makes children become socialized into their
parents’ religion as they become familiar with the belief, doctrine, rituals, tradition, and fellow
5
members. Nonconformity in his model is generated by a mismatch between a believer’s income
earning and the level of strictness of a particular denomination, where the assumed utility function
implies a substitution eﬀect between income and strictness. Thus, high income people will seek
less strict (or more secular) denominations. The interesting feature in Montgomery’s model is
that individuals may leave their parents’ denomination either because it is too strict or too lax,
depending on their social class as manifested by their income. Depending on income distribution,
Montgomery’s model can predict the rise and fall of new denominations and sects, as well as
secular denominations, that can be endogenously determined within the model.
The economics literature on social inﬂuence and conformism includes Weiss and Fershtman
(1998) who survey the ideas and results from sociology and economics, recognizing that economic
decisions are often shaped by social concerns and inﬂuences. There is a vast theoretical literature
on the eﬀects of conformity and social pressure on consumption demand and prices. This literature
includes Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Bernheim (1994), and much earlier publications such as
Leibenstein (1950) and Veblen (1899). In particular, some papers such as Hackner and Nyberg
(1996), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), and Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001), analyze negative social
externalities commonly addressed to as vanity, snobbism, or simply nonconformity.
On the “theological” side, there are some empirical papers investigating why and which
type of people tend to switch religions. Loveland (2003) shows that formally joining a church
while growing up acts to stabilize preferences for a denomination. Other papers testing the
determinants of switching religions include Sherkat (1991) and Hadaway, Kirk, and Marler (1993)
(see also their references). However, these ﬁndings are less related to the present investigation
since religious switching is a much weaker concept than conversion. That is, a change from a
Baptist denomination to a Methodist denomination is a switch just as a switch from a Protestant
denomination into the Roman Catholic faith is a switch. In contrast, a change from the Catholic
faith, or more relevantly to the present paper, a change from an agnostic belief into Judaism
would better be termed as conversion. Unfortunately I am not aware of similar statistical studies
exploring the exact determinants of conversions in general, and the conversion between a secular
belief to (and from) a religious aﬃliation in particular.
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Finally, our model relies on diﬀerences in birth rates between secular and religious people
as one (but not the only one) factor inﬂuencing the paths of secular and religious population
groups. The cross eﬀects between religious aﬃliations and fertility rates are noted in Lehrer
(1996). These factors are important in addition to other demographic variables such as marriage,
number of children, and work habits which are surveyed in Lehrer (2004). In fact, higher fertility
rates among some religious groups relative to secular people may be explained by the fact that
some religions provide psychological and social rewards to couples who have many children, in
the form of approval, social status, and blessings.
1.5 Organization
The present study is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the benchmark inﬁnite-horizon
overlapping-generations environment designed for the purpose of analyzing two-way conversion
patterns between secular and religious aﬃliations. Section 3 focuses on the behavioral approach
by introducing the church and parents who are willing to invest in “proper” education for the
purpose of increasing the conformity rate of their children. Section 4 computes and characterizes
dynamic equilibria of the deterministic model. Section 5 simulates equilibrium secularization and
religious paths, and also calibrates the model for some speciﬁc observations to obtain estimates
for the magnitude of religious nonconformity. Section 6 develops two alternative models of
religious nonconformity by characterizing several utility functions that generate the nonconformity
patterns leading to the conversions described in the basic model. Section 7 oﬀers some concluding
comments.
2. A Model of Conformity and Conversion
Consider an overlapping generations model of individuals who can choose to aﬃliate themselves
with one and only one of two communities labeled S and R. Community R consists of individuals
who are aﬃliated and practice a religious faith. Community S consists of individuals who consider
themselves as nonreligious secular people. Therefore, by conversion we refer to a young person
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who is born secular and then becomes religious, and the vice versa.
All individuals live for two periods. At the end of their ﬁrst period individuals choose whether
to aﬃliate themselves with a religious faith or with the secular people.3 In each period t, there
are st−1t and r
t−1
t generation g = t − 1 old secular and religious people, respectively. Thus,
superscripts denote generations whereas subscripts denote time periods. In period t = 1, there
are initial s0 = s01 and r
0 = r01 generation g = 0 secular and religious people who are old at t = 1.
Let βS > 0 and βR > 0 denote the birth rates of secular and religious people, respectively.
Birth rates are deﬁned as the number of oﬀsprings per each old person. Clearly, the believer
and nonbeliever population groups are nondecreasing if βS, βR ≥ 1, and declining if βS, βR < 1.
We assume that individuals are born as either conformists or nonconformists where conformism
is to be deﬁned below. Formally, let γtS and γ
t
R, where 0 < γ
t
S, γ
t
R < 1, denote the fraction of
the young who are born as conformists to secular and religious people, respectively, in period t.
Therefore, the fractions (1 − γtS) and (1 − γtR) of all newly born secular and religious people are
born as nonconformists. Note that the conformity rates could be variables that are inﬂuenced by
the church, see Section 3 for the behavioral approach. Alternatively, γtS and γ
t
R can be treated as
exogenously-given parameters that eventually must be estimated, see the deterministic approach
in Sections 4 and the calibration in Section 5.
The above discussion implies that the numbers of young religious and secular generation g = t
conformists, labeled as c, and nonconformists, labeled n, as functions of the old of generation
g = t − 1, are given by
crtt = βR γ
t
R r
t−1
t
nrtt = βR(1 − γtR)rt−1t , (1a)
cstt = βS γ
t
S s
t−1
t
nstt = βS(1 − γtS)st−1t (1b)
for t = 1, 2, . . .. Clearly, crtt +
nrtt = r
t
t and
cstt +
nstt = s
t
t meaning that the young of each gener-
ation belonging to each community are divided exactly into the conformists and nonconformists
subgroups according to (1a) and (1b).
3Iannaccone (1998) reports on research conﬁrming our assumption that conversion decisions are made by
young individuals and that conversions among older people should be very rare.
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We deﬁne conversion as a decision by a young individual to switch between groups. Clearly,
two conversions are possible: A young individual who is born to religious parents can convert
to become secular, and a young person who is born to secular parents can convert and join a
religious faith. We therefore make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. In each period, all young conformists adopt the same aﬃliation as their par-
ents’, whereas all nonconformists convert and aﬃliate themselves against their parents’ belief.
Assumption 1 identiﬁes those who convert by those who do not conform with their parents’ belief.
This raises the question whether and how parents can reduce their oﬀsprings’ conversion rates
by simply reducing the rate of nonconformity, or the probability that their oﬀsprings become
nonconformists. The roles of parents and the church in inﬂuencing conformity rates γtR and γ
t
S
are analyzed in Section 3 below.
The populations consisting of conformists and nonconformists described by (1a) and (1b) and
Assumption 1 imply that the secular and religious populations of generation g = t who are old
in period t + 1, as functions of the generation t − 1 religious and secular groups, are given by
rtt+1 = βR γ
t
R r
t−1
t + βS(1 − γtS)st−1t (2a)
stt+1 = βR(1 − γtR)rt−1t + βS γtS st−1t , (2b)
for each period t = 1, 2, . . .. Therefore, (2a) reveals that each new generation of religious people
consists of the fraction γtR of the previous generation of believers, and a fraction (1 − γtS) of
the secular people of the previous generation, who converted to become religious when young.
Clearly, all these ﬁgures must be multiplied by the relevant birth rates, βR or βS. Equation (2b)
reveals that each new generation of secular people consists of the fraction (1 − γtR) of religious
people who converted to become secular when young, and the fraction γtS of those who adhere
to their parents’ secular belief.
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3. The Behavioral Approach: The Role of the Church
This section introduces into the model parents who are concerned with the possibility that their
children will convert against their own belief. Moreover, we assume that parents can inﬂuence
the conformity rates of their children by letting the conformity rates (or probabilities) γtR and
γtS depend on parents’ investment in “proper” education. For religious parents, this investment
includes enrollment of their children to Sunday schools, denomination-oriented private schools,
repeated church attendance, and holiday celebrations.4 Investment in secular education is harder
to describe, and may not even exist in signiﬁcant levels as it is intended to prevent children
from becoming religious. Such antireligious education may paradoxically include some religious
education in order to make the children aware of the diﬀerent approaches.
3.1 Parents, “proper” education, and the Church
From the above discussion, we can infer that there are some asymmetries between religious
education and secular education concerning the consequences of this education on children’s
conformity rates. That is, religious education tends to be more organized and more community
supported than secular education. In fact, secular education seems to prevail more at the family
level compared with religious education which is church-supported.5 Let Ret−1t and Se
t−1
t denote
the period t expenditure of a generation t − 1 parent on religious or secular education of their
children, respectively. Also, let the probability that a young would become a conformist γ depend
on parents’ education expenditure and satisfy γ(0) = 0, γ(e) → 1 as e → +∞, γ′ > 0, and
γ′′ < 0. That is, if parents don’t invest in their children, their children will surely become
nonconformists (and hence will convert). However, even by spending a large amount on “proper”
education, parents cannot guarantee 100% conformity by their children. For the remainder of
4Business week, May 23, 2005, reports that the Evangelist Lakewood enterprise, that brought in $55 million
in one year, plans a Sunday school for 5,000 children in downtown Houston. The main campus of Groeschel’s
Life Church in Edmond, Okla., with a weekly Sunday school attendance of 2,500, includes a “Toon Town” of 3D
buildings, a 16-foot high slide, and an animatronic police chief who recites rules.
5Secular education should not be confused with publically-funded general education. Here, by secular education
I mean education intended to prevent children from becoming religious.
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this section, we make the following assumption concerning the eﬀect of education spending on
the rates of conformity.
Assumption 2. (a) Conformity-enhancing education of children of religious parents is provided
by the church via contributions from parents. Formally, the period t probability that a young
who is born to a religious person would become a conformist is γtR = γ(r
t−1
t · Ret−1t ).
(b) Conformity-enhancing education of children of secular parents is individually ﬁnanced by each
parent separately. Formally, the period t probability that a young who is born to a secular
person would become a conformist is γtS = γ(
Set−1t ).
Assumption 2(a) highlights the role played by the church as a generator of an externality associated
with the “investment in conformity” by religious parents. This externality, and also the resulting
free rider eﬀect, are reﬂected by the assumption that the conformity rate is aﬀected by aggregate
expenditure of religious parents as given by product rt−1t · Ret−1t . This is in contrast with (b)
where only the individual parent’s expenditure Set−1t matters for the conformity rate of children
of secular parents. Assumption 2(a) portrays a church that collects a contribution/fee of Ret−1t
from each adult member. These contributions from all religious parents are then combined to
ﬁnance church services targeted for convincing young people to remain religious.
Important Remark: Some people may object to Assumption 2 by arguing that it is the public
school system that actually generates an investment externality in secular conformity, and not
the investment in religious conformity which is privately ﬁnanced. I don’t wish to argue with this
claim since readers who believe that Assumption 2 should be reversed can simply relabel R as
secular (instead of religious), and S as religious (instead of secular), and the entire model goes
through. Finally, I must point out that in some countries, where separation of church and state
are not fully observed, Assumption 2 should be made even stronger as religious studies are forced
by the public school system, which is ﬁnanced by all taxpayers.
We now formally deﬁne the preferences of parents. Note that there is no need to deﬁne the
preferences of young people as they simply follow the conversion rules described by Assumption 1.
11
The period t utility functions of generation t − 1 religious and secular parents are given by
RU t−1t
def= αγtR − Ret−1t = αγ(rt−1t · Ret−1t ) − Ret−1t (3a)
SU t−1t
def= αγtS − Set−1t = αγ(Set−1t ) − Set−1t , (3b)
where rt−1t is the number of religious parents given by (2a), and α > 1 is a parameter that
measures the importance of children’s conformity rate. Thus, the utility function of each adult
religious and an adult secular parent is the probability of their children becoming conformists less
than the expenditure on “proper” education intended to inﬂuence the corresponding conformity
probability. The church chooses a common expenditure level Ret−1t to maximize (3a). A secular
parent chooses expenditure level Set−1t to maximize (3b). By the strict concavity of the function
γ, the ﬁrst order conditions yield
γ′(rt−1t · Ret−1t ) =
1
α rt−1t
(4a)
γ′(Set−1t ) =
1
α
. (4b)
The utility maximization conditions (4a) and (4b) and the concavity of the function γ together
imply that γtR > γ
t
S meaning that the rate of conformism among children of religious parents is
higher than that of children of secular parents. This result follows from the externality assumption,
Assumption 2(a). However, this result does not necessarily imply that religious parents spend more
on education than secular parents since (4a) implies that sign(de/dr) =sign[−rγ′′/(γ′ + rγ′′)],
which depends on the precise speciﬁcation of the function γ.
Finally, after extracting the equilibrium parents’ education expenses Ret−1t (r
t−1
t ) and Se
t−1
t ,
from the ﬁrst-order conditions (4a) and (4b), we can obtain the equilibrium conformity rates γtR
and γtS. Substituting these into (2a) and (2b) yields the dynamic equilibrium paths of the number
religious and secular people.
3.2 An example
Let the conformity function γ take the form of γ(e) def= 1−1/(e+1). Clearly, γ(0) = 0, γ(e) → 1
as e → +∞, γ′ > 0, and γ′′ < 0. In view of Assumption 2, the conformity rates among religious
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and secular young as functions of their parents’ expenditure are given by
γtR(
Ret−1t , r
t−1
t ) = 1 −
1
rt−1t · Ret−1t
and γtS(
Set−1t ) = 1 −
1
Set−1t
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (3a) and (3b), the church and each secular parent of generation t−1 choose
their period t education expenditures Ret−1t and Se
t−1
t respectively, to solve
max
Ret−1t
RU t−1t = α −
α
rt−1t · Ret−1t
− Ret−1t (6a)
max
Set−1t
SU t−1t = α −
α
Set−1t
− Set−1t . (6b)
The unique utility-maximizing expenditure levels are
Ret−1t =
√
rt−1t
√
α − 1
rt−1t
, and Set−1t =
√
α − 1. (7)
A natural question to ask at this stage is whether religious parents spend more or less on “con-
formity” education compared to secular parents. Comparing the two expenditures given by (7)
yields the following result.
Result 1. Given that religious conformity education is run by the church, period t religious
parents spend less on conformity education relative to secular parents if and only if the period t
number of religious parents is suﬃciently large. Formally,
Ret−1t ≤ Set−1t if and only if rt−1t ≥
1√
(α − 1)2 .
Thus, strong externality eﬀects prevailing in large churches induce the church to reduce the
expenditure on conformity of children of religious parents relative to secular parents. The reverse
occurs when the number of religious parents is small, in which case religious parents spend more
than secular parents on maintaining conformity.
Substituting the equilibrium education expenditure levels (7) into (5), the equilibrium rates
of conformity are then given by
γtR(r
t−1
t ) = 1 −
1√
rt−1t
√
α
and γtS = 1 −
1√
α
. (8)
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Clearly, the conformity rate among children of religious parents exceeds that of children of secular
parents as long as the period t number of religious parents satisﬁes rt−1t ≥ 1.
Table 3 provides an example how endogenously-determined education levels can be computed.
I chose simple numbers just for the sake of illustration. For example, Set−1t =
√
α − 1 = 1 is
t rt−1t s
t−1
t
Ret−1t
Set−1t γ
t
R(r
t−1
t ) γtS
1 50 50 0.26 1.00 0.93 0.50
2 71 29 0.22 1.00 0.94 0.50
3 82 18 0.22 1.00 0.94 0.50
4 86 14 0.20 1.00 0.95 0.50
6 90 10 0.20 1.00 0.95 0.50
9 90 10 0.20 1.00 0.95 0.50
Table 3: Hypothetical evolution of religious and secular groups and endogenously-determined invest-
ments in “conformity” education. Simulations assume βR = βS = 1 and α = 4.
the private expenditure by a secular parent. Hence, the conformity rate among secular young is
constant γtS = 1 − 1/
√
α = 0.5. In contrast, the conformity education by religious parents given
by (7) declines from 0.26 to 0.2 thereby reﬂecting an externality eﬀect that is increasing with
the number of religious parents who contribute to the church. Clearly, the increase in aggregate
expenditure by religious parents increases the conformity rate among religious young, from 0.93
to 0.95.
The simple example given by Table 3 demonstrates a fast convergence from an initial ratio
of 50% religious people climbing up to 90% within four generations. This example is based on
Assumption 2 which models the church as a generator of a conformity education externality. As
explained in a comment right below Assumption 2, changing the role of the education spending
externality can produce an equilibrium where secular people become the majority.
4. The Deterministic Approach: Dynamic Equilibria
The analysis of Section 3 has demonstrated how the conformity rates γS and γR can be endogenously-
determined within the overlapping-generations framework analyzed in this paper (see also Sec-
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tion 6 below). For the purpose of calibration, however, this section and also Section 5 treat
the conformity rates γS and γR as given parameters. Therefore, we now return to the basic
overlapping generations model developed in Section 2. The basic model generates unique equi-
librium aﬃliation paths, which will be shown to depend mainly on the population birth rates, βS
and βR, as well as the conformity and nonconformity parameters, γS and γR. In what follows,
Subsection 4.1 derives the basic intuition for a symmetric case under equal birth and conformity
rates (but still maintains diﬀerent initial aﬃliation levels so that r0 need not be equal to s0).
Subsection 4.2 characterizes equilibrium aﬃliation paths under complete asymmetry.
4.1 Dynamic equilibrium under equal conformity and birth rates
In this subsection we analyze the simplest case where religious and secular people have identical
birth rates, and their young oﬀsprings share a common proportion of conformists and noncon-
formists. Formally, in this subsection we assume that βS = βR = β, and that γS = γR = γ.
Applying repeated substitution and backward induction on (2a) and (2b) yield the period t+1
total numbers of generation g = t believers and secular people during their second period. Thus,
for t = 1, 2, . . . ,
rtt+1 =
βt(r0 − s0)(2γ − 1)t + βt(r0 + s0)
2
(9a)
stt+1 =
βt(s0 − r0)(2γ − 1)t + βt(r0 + s0)
2
. (9b)
Hence, the numbers of religious and secular old people is a linear combination of the initial
diﬀerence in group sizes, |r0 − s0| and the aggregate population size r0 + s0, both multiplied
by the common period t birth factor βt. However, the ﬁrst terms in (9a) and (9b) decline very
fast since (2γ − 1)t −→ 0 as t increases. Figure 1 displays how the populations of religious
and nonreligious people evolve over time for case where most people are born as conformists
(γ > 1/2). Figure 1 illustrates that the religious and secular population groups converge to equal
sizes in the long run regardless of the initial diﬀerence between the population groups, r0−s0, and
regardless of whether the total population is increasing or declining over time. Since conformists
constitute a majority (γ > 1/2), the majority of people in each subsequent generation continue to
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Figure 1: Evolution of religious and secular populations over time under γ > 1/2 and r0 > s0.
Left: β > 1, Middle: β = 1, Right: β < 1.
adhere to their parents’ belief. Therefore, the group that starts out as the largest group (religious
people in the case plotted in Figure 1) remains the largest over time, but the diﬀerence between
the group sizes converges very fast towards zero.
Figure 2 plots the polar case relative to Figure 1 assuming that conformists constitute the
minority in the society (γ < 1/2). Figure 2 illustrates that when nonconformists constitute


rtt+1, s
t
t+1
t
r0+s0
2
0 3 41 2
ﬃ


	





rtt+1
stt+1
r0
s0
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
•
Figure 2: Evolution of religious and secular population over time under γ < 1/2, r0 > s0, and constant
population βS = βR = 1.
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the majority in a society, the large number of conversions in each period shifts the majority
population of believers into the majority of secular people and vice versa as time progresses.
These oscillations are dampened over time as the size of each group converges to half of the
population size. Figure 2 is drawn under constant aggregate population (β = 1) for convenience
only, but the reader should bear in mind that these oscillations can be plotted around the upward-
and downward-sloping curves drawn in Figure 1(left) and 1(right), respectively.
We summarize our results for the symmetry case as follows.
Result 2. Under Assumption 1, and under complete symmetry, βS = βR = β and γS = γR = γ,
(a) For any initial distribution of people between the two groups, s0 and r0, the population
sizes of secular and religious people converge to half of the total population size. That is,
stt+1 ≈ rtt+1 ≈ βt(s0 + r0)/2 for suﬃciently large t.
(b) If conformists constitute the majority in a society, the religious population will exceed the
secular population if and only if the initial religious population is larger than the initial secular
population. Formally, if γ > 1/2, then rtt+1 ≥ stt+1 if and only if r0 ≥ s0. In contrast,
(c) If nonconformists constitute the majority (γ < 1/2), then the relative population sizes os-
cillate where if the religious population constitutes a majority in one period, secular people
constitute a majority in a subsequent period, and the other way around.
Parts (b) and (c) follow directly by subtracting (9b) from (9a) to obtain rtt+1 − stt+1 = βt(r0 −
s0)(2γ − 1)t. Therefore, for γ < 1/2, the sign of this diﬀerence depends on whether t takes even
or odd values.
Result 2 predicts that societies will be equally divided between religious and nonreligious
people. That is, the believer and nonbeliever groups will converge to be of equal size and equal
share in the total population in the long run. Clearly, since this prediction is unlikely to be
observed in reality, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 3. The number of religious and secular people in the long run can diﬀer only if either
the two groups exhibit diﬀerent birth rates, or diﬀerent proportions of conformists and noncon-
formists.
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In view of Corollary 3, the following subsections explore dynamic equilibria under unequal birth
rates and unequal proportions of conformists and nonconformists among the religious and the
secular groups.
4.2 Dynamic asymmetric equilibria: The general case
In this subsection, we further extend the model by allowing for unequal birth rates (βS = βR)
and unequal proportions of conformists and nonconformists among the young in each group
(γS = γR). Since explicit solutions like the one given by (9a) and (9b) are hard to obtain for the
general asymmetric case, we characterize the secular and religious evolution paths directly from
the recursive laws of motion given by (2a) and (2b). This system of equations implies that the
ratio of generation g = t old religious people to the total old generation g = t population is given
by
f(t) def=
rtt+1
rtt+1 + stt+1
=
βRγRr
t−1
t + βS(1 − γS)st−1t
βRr
t−1
t + βSs
t−1
t
, t = 1, 2, . . . (10)
The function f is a contraction that converges to the steady-state equilibrium to be solved from
f(t + 1) = f(t) for all t = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Thus, (10) implies that the steady-state ratio of secular
to religious people is
s
r
=
2βR(1 − γR)√
β2Rγ
2
R + 2βRβS[γR(γS − 2) − 2(γS − 1)] + β2Sγ2S + βRγR − βSγS
. (11)
It can be easily veriﬁed from (11) that s = r for any parameter values satisfying βS = βR and
γS = γR, which is consistent with our derivations in Subsection 4.1. The ratio obtained in (11)
leads us to the following result.
Result 4. For any given birth rates βS and βR, and any given proportions of conformists and
nonconformists among young people, γS and γR, the long-run ratio of secular to religious people
is independent of the initial distribution of secular and religious people, s0 and r0.
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Result 4 provides the key for understanding how the composition of secular and religious people
may completely change over time since it highlights that in the long run only the relative birth
rates and the proportion of nonconformists will matter.
In order to emphasize the role played by the diﬀerent birth-rates, substituting βS = βR into
(11) yields
s
r
∣∣∣
βS=βR
=
1 − γR
1 − γS . (12)
This proves the following result.
Result 5. Under any birth rates satisfying βS = βR,
(a) The long-run ratio of secular to religious people depends only on the proportion of conformists
to nonconformists among the young within each group.
(b) The long-term number of religious people exceeds the number of secular people if and only if
young religious people tend to be more conformists relative to young secular people. Formally,
r ≥ s if and only if γR ≥ γS.
5. Simulations and Calibration
This section brings the model closer to reality by ﬁrst testing the predictions of the model for
hypothetical birth and conformity rates in Subsection 5.1. Then, Subsection 5.2 calibrates for
the conformity and nonconformity rates in the two communities using real-life data on birth rates
and the proportions of secular and religious people in the United States.
5.1 Some numerical simulations: The general case
The dynamic equilibrium characterized in the previous section can be numerically simulated by
applying the laws of motion described by (2a) and (2b). All these simulations conﬁrm fast
convergence to the steady-stage evolution path characterized by (11). Table 4 displays a variety
of numerical simulations and the fast convergence to the steady-state path given in (11).
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t rtt+1 s
t
t+1 r
t
t+1 + s
t
t+1
rtt+1
rtt+1+s
t
t+1
stt+1
rtt+1+s
t
t+1
rtt+1
stt+1
r
s
eq.(11)
0 400 100 500 0.8000 0.2000 4.0000
Symmetry case: βR = βS = 1.1 and γR = γS = 0.8
1 374 176 550 0.6800 0.3200 2.1250 1.0000
2 368 273 605 0.6080 0.3920 1.5510 1.0000
3 376 290 666 0.6080 0.3920 1.5510 1.0000
5 421 384 805 0.5233 0.4767 1.0979 1.0000
8 541 530 1072 0.5050 0.4950 1.0204 1.0000
Unequal birth rates: βR = 1.1 < 1.4 = βS and γR = 0.8 = γS
1 380 200 580 0.6552 0.3448 1.9000 0.7076
2 390 308 698 0.5593 0.4407 1.2692 0.7076
3 430 430 860 0.5000 0.5000 1.0000 0.7076
5 600 755 1356 0.4427 0.5573 0.7945 0.7076
8 1166 1613 2779 0.4197 0.5803 0.7231 0.7076
Unequal conformists: βR = 1.1 = βS and γR = 0.6 < 0.9 = γS
1 275 275 550 0.5000 0.5000 1.000 0.2500
2 212 393 605 0.3500 0.3500 0.5385 0.2500
3 183 482 666 0.2750 0.7250 0.3793 0.2500
5 176 629 805 0.2188 0.7813 0.2800 0.2500
8 217 855 1072 0.2023 0.7977 0.2537 0.2500
Table 4: Hypothetical evolution of religious and secular groups.
Table 4 portrays a society that starts out with r01 = 400 religious and s
0
1 = 100 secular people
who are old in period t = 1. Thus, with no loss of generality these simulations are conﬁned to
an initial ratio of 4:1. The column on the right is the steady-state ratio of religious old people to
secular old people computed directly from (11). The column next to column on the right displays
the simulated ratio of religious to secular old people for generations t = 1, 2, 3, 5, 8. This column
clearly demonstrates a fast convergence to its stead-state level computed in (11).
The top part of Table 4 simulates the symmetric case analyzed in Subsection 4.1 and Figure 1.
This part conﬁrms Result 2 by demonstrating the fast convergence to the steady-state 1:1 ratio
of religious to secular people, regardless of the initial ratio (4:1 in the present example).
The middle part of Table 4 simulates unequal birth rates, where I deliberately assumed that
βR < βS to demonstrate that unequal birth rates are suﬃcient to explain long-term diﬀerences
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between the two population groups. This example demonstrates that the largest group (religious
people) can become a minority if its birth rate is below the birth rate of the other group (secular
people).
The bottom part of Table 4 simulates unequal proportion of conformists and nonconformists
between the groups. This part conﬁrms Result 5 demonstrating that diﬀerences in size distribution
among the groups can be explained solely by the emergence of diﬀerent proportions of conformists
and nonconformists in diﬀerent congregations, religious and secular groups. Section 3 has already
demonstrated the role of the church (or public education) in creating these diﬀerences. The choice
of γR < γS was simply to demonstrate again that initial size distribution (ratio of 4:1) can be
reversed into a 1:4 ratio of religious to secular people if we assume that children who are born to
religious parents tend to be less conformists than children to secular people (in this example).
5.2 Calibration for (non)conformity rates
Our model predicts the secular and religious aﬃliation paths based on four parameters: The birth
rates, βR and βS, and the proportion of conformists, γR and γS. From a practical point of view,
the birth rates are clearly observable and therefore can be obtained, whereas the conformity rates
are much harder to ﬁnd. This is partly because the conformity and nonconformity behavior can
be viewed as utility-based choices that can be observed only via formal surveys. For this reason,
in this subsection we demonstrate how to calibrate for the secular and religious conformity and
nonconformity parameters using real-life data on birth rates and the actual number of secular and
religious people in the United States.
Mosher, Williams, and Johnson (1992) carefully analyze how fertility rates in the United
States are aﬀected by the particular religious and nonreligious aﬃliation of mothers. The data is
processed from the 1982 and 1988 National Surveys of Family Growth conducted by the National
Center of Health Statistics, where mothers stated whether there are Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
something else, or none which was interpreted as no religious aﬃliation. The surveyed women
(ages 15–44) not only stated how many children they have, but also had to estimate the number
of children they expect to have during their lifetime. The ﬁndings clearly indicate that diﬀerent
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religions and secular people have very diﬀerent birth rates: 2.4 children per Catholic woman, 2.2
for a Protestant, and 2.02 for a Jewish women. The total expected births of nonreligious mothers
was 1.81 per mother, which constituted the lowest in this survey.
For the present calibration, since most religious people are classiﬁed as protestants, the number
of births per religious woman will be taken to be 2.22, whereas the number of children per
nonreligious woman is taken to be 1.81. Therefore, assuming that women constitute 50% of the
population, the number of religious and secular oﬀsprings per adult are taken to be βR = 2.22/2 =
1.11 and βS = 1.81/2 = 0.905. Next, Table 2 implies that during the year 2000 the ratio of secular
(nonreligious and atheists combined) to religious people was s/r = (0.4+0.9)/(1− 0.4− 0.9) =
47/453. Assuming that the aﬃliation levels during the year 2000 are around their steady-state
levels, we substitute for βS, βR, and s/r into (11), and then solve for γR to obtain
γR =
45156569
50283000
+
8507
100566
γS ≈ 0.898 + 0.0846 γS. (13)
The relationship (13) provides the calibrated real value of the fraction of conformists among
religious people as a function of this fraction among secular people, which is also plotted in
Figure 3. Figure 3 indicates that the fraction of conformists is likely to be higher among religious
people relative to secular people, as one may expect. Moreover, even though Figure 3 and (13)
are merely functions, we can see that any possible calibrated value of γR must fall inside a small
interval, as stated by the following result.
Result 6. According to present calibration, more than 90% of children who are born to religious
people are classiﬁed as conformists and therefore are unlikely to become secular.
6. Two Alternative Models of Religious Nonconformity
Section 3 has already demonstrated how the conformity rates can be exogenously determined
by modeling parents’ investment in “proper” conformity-enhancing education. In this section,
I propose some alternative formulations by specifying diﬀerent preferences towards secular and
religious denominations (Subsection 6.1), and preferences over the network sizes associated with
each type of beliefs (Subsection 6.2).
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Figure 3: Calibrated relationship between fraction of conformists born to religious and secular parents,
given by (13). Note: Vertical axis is not drawn to scale for the sake of illustration only.
6.1 Religious strictness and conversion cost
Suppose that the densities of newborns to secular and religious parents are such that all newborns
are distributed on the closed interval [0, 1]. Following Montgomery (1996), each newborn is
indexed by 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 to indicate her preference for the level of strictness imposed by her
aﬃliation. Under this interpretation, an individual indexed by σ closer to 1 prefers to practice a
strict religion whereas those indexed close to 0 prefer the least strict religion. For our purposes
σ = 1 will represent the strongest preference for a religious aﬃliation, whereas σ = 0 the strongest
preference for secular life.
We assume that any individual can convert only at the end of her ﬁrst period. Clearly, the
decision to convert is based on forward looking to the individual’s second-period utility. Then,
we can assume that the second-period utility functions of individuals indexed by σ and who are
born to secular and religious parents are given by
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US
def=
{
(1 − σ)vS Does not convert
σvR − cR Converts to R
and UR
def=
{
σvR Does not convert
(1 − σ)vS − cS Converts to S .
(14)
Thus, the parameters vS and vR are the basic utilities derived from secular and religious aﬃlia-
tion, respectively; and cS and cR denote the cost of conversion to become secular or religious,
respectively. Clearly we must assume that 0 ≤ max{cS, cR} < min{vS, vR} in order to induce
some conversion in both directions. It should be noted that conversion costs (resemble switching
costs commonly assumed in Industrial Organization) are very important for our study since con-
version generally involves disputes and often disconnection from parents, other family members,
relocation, and in some instances high learning costs (such as conversion to Judaism). All these
are summarized by the parameters cS and cR. For the sake of illustration only, let cS = cR = c.
Consider ﬁrst an individual indexed by σ who is born to secular parents. The utility function
stated in (14) implies that this individual will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to convert and become religious if
σvR − c > (1 − σ)vS, hence if σ > σSR def= vS + c
vS + vR
. (15)
Similarly, an individual indexed by σ who is born to religious parents will choose to convert and
become secular if
(1 − σ)vS − c > σvR, hence if σ < σRS def= vS − c
vS + vR
. (16)
Figure 4 illustrates the range of individuals who convert and who do not convert against their
parents’ belief. The space [0, 1] represents the heterogeneity of all newborns to religious and
secular parents. Clearly, (15), (16), and Figure 4 imply that
Result 7. (a) Newborns to secular parents who are endowed with a strong preference for religious
strictness, (formally, those indexed by σ > σSR) convert to become religious.
(b) Newborns to religious parents who are endowed with a strong preference against religious
strictness, (formally, those indexed by σ < σRS ) convert to become secular.
(c) All newborns who have a moderate preference for religious strictness (formally, those indexed
by σSR ≤ σ ≤ σRS ) adhere to their parents’ belief regardless of whether they are born to
secular parents or to religious parents.
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Figure 4: Conversions patterns and directions.
Result 7 conﬁrms similar results obtained by Montgomery (1996) in an entirely diﬀerent setup.
Both models predict that only people with a strong preference for and against religious strictness
end up converting, whereas all the newborns with a moderate preference adhere to their parents’
belief.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the model presented in this section is that it is one-
hundred percent consistent with our benchmark model and therefore provides some additional
micro foundations for the conformity and nonconformity behavior from religious and secular
perspectives. This feature is summarized by the following result.
Result 8. The conversion patterns generated by the consumer preferences deﬁned in (14) support
the simple conversion rules given by Assumption 1. Formally,
(a) Setting γS = σSR yields the fraction of newborns to secular parents who are conformists and
therefore adhere to their parents’ secular belief, and
(b) Setting γR = 1 − σRS yields the fraction of newborns to religious parents who are also
conformists and therefore adhere to their parents’ religious belief.
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6.2 Network-based conversion rules
Under network-based preferences, individuals derive utility or disutility from the size of the com-
munity associated with each belief. Social inﬂuences of this kind have been discussed in economics
ever since Veblen (1899). The model developed in this subsection can be interpreted as before,
secular versus religious population groups, or as a model of two competing religions called S and
R, see a discussion on possible interpretations in Section 7 below. As before, two-period lived
individuals are born to parents aﬃliated with either S or R. At the end of their ﬁrst period,
individuals choose whether to adhere to their parents’ religion in their second period, or whether
to convert to the other religion and practice it during their second period.
Clearly, a “network-based” conversion decision must take into consideration that the children
will also be aﬃliated with the new religion at their ﬁrst period of life. The decision to convert also
must take into consideration how other believers of the same generation choose their aﬃliation
during their second period as well as how many children they will have. By construction, individu-
als are born into a certain religion and do not switch until the end of their ﬁrst period. Therefore,
for conversion decision purposes, we need to deﬁne only an individual’s second-period utility func-
tion. Formally, the period t + 1 utility of a conformist and a nonconformist of generation g = t
born to any type of parents are given by
U tt+1(k)
def=
{
µk
(
[1 + βS]stt+1
)
aﬄiated with S in period t + 1
µk
(
[1 + βR]rtt+1
)
aﬄiated with R in period t + 1,
(17)
where k = c if the individual is born as a conformist, and k = n if born as a nonconformist. The
function µk(·) measures an individual’s utility from the size of the community aﬃliated with the
religion of her choice. The community size consists of the old at t + 1 plus the young who are
born according to the birth rates βS and βR. Our analysis will rely on the following simplifying
assumptions.
Assumption 3. (a) All individuals have perfect foresight for predicting the number of believers
aﬃliated with each religion. In addition, individuals believe that their own choice does not
aﬀect these numbers.
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(b) Conformists prefer larger communities whereas nonconformists prefer smaller communities.
Formally, the function µc is increasing and µn is decreasing with community sizes.
(c) A fraction γS of the children born to S-aﬃliated and a fraction γR to R-aﬃliated parents
are conformists. All others are born as nonconformists.
Part (a) states that all believers consider themselves as negligible relative to the entire popula-
tion in the sense that their individual choice does not aﬀect the network sizes. Assumption 3(b)
simpliﬁes our analysis by focusing on two extreme types of conformists and nonconformists. Con-
formists prefer to join the most popular religion (largest network) whereas nonconformists exhibit
vanity or snob type behavior, leading them to choose the least popular religion (smallest network
of believers). It should be pointed out that the meanings of conformists and nonconformists are
very diﬀerent from the previous models presented in this paper. Here, individuals do not have a
preference over whether to convert or a preference for a speciﬁc religion. Instead, individuals care
only about the size of the communities aﬃliated with each religion. Clearly, this assumption on
preferences needs to be further motivated, therefore the reader is referred to the last paragraph
of the concluding section, Section 7, for further discussions on the assumed network preferences.
As with most network-based models, the equilibrium paths are not unique and are driven by
self-fulﬁlling expectations. That is, if on an equilibrium path all individuals expect religion S to
be more popular than religion R in some period t+1, then at the end of period t all conformists
will adhere/convert to S whereas all nonconformists will adhere/convert to R. Formally stated,
if
(1 + βS)stt+1 ≥ (1 + βR)rtt+1 then
{
stt+1 = γS s
t−1
t + γR r
t−1
t
rtt+1 = (1 − γS)st−1t + (1 − γR)rt−1t .
(18)
In contrast, if all individuals believe that religion R will dominate in period t+1, then at the end
of period t all conformists will adhere/covert to R whereas all nonconformists will adhere/convert
to S. Formally, if
(1 + βR)rtt+1 ≥ (1 + βS)stt+1 then
{
stt+1 = (1 − γS)st−1t + (1 − γR)rt−1t
rtt+1 = γS s
t−1
t + γR r
t−1
t .
(19)
The multiplicity of equilibria stems from the fact that (18) and (19) are not mutually ex-
clusive. A unique equilibrium can exist only for large diﬀerences in birth rates under which the
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religion with the relatively high birth rate dominates forever. Otherwise, when both (18) and
(19) hold, in each period there are two possible allocations of believers between the two religions
which could generate a large number of equilibrium paths. Table 5 displays several such equilibria.
Equilibrium #1 in Table 5 corresponds to a common self-fulﬁlling expectation among all believers
# Exp. Religion 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Symmetry case: βR = βS = 1.1 and γR = γS = 0.8
1 CON stt+1 100 440 484 532 586 644 709 779 857 943
1 NON rtt+1 400 110 121 133 146 161 177 195 214 236
2 NON stt+1 100 110 121 133 146 161 177 195 214 236
2 CON rtt+1 400 440 484 532 586 644 709 779 857 943
3 MIX stt+1 100 440 121 532 146 644 177 779 214 943
3 MIX rtt+1 400 110 484 133 586 161 709 195 857 236
Small diﬀerence in birth rates: βS = 1.4 > 1.1 = βR and γR = γS = 0.8
4 CON stt+1 100 560 750 1006 1347 1806 2419 3242 4344 5821
4 NON rtt+1 400 110 147 198 265 355 475 637 853 1143
5 NON stt+1 100 140 162 188 219 253 294 341 396 459
5 CON rtt+1 400 440 510 592 687 797 924 1072 1244 1443
6 MIX stt+1 100 560 188 870 292 1353 453 2103 705 3269
6 MIX rtt+1 400 110 590 171 916 266 1425 413 2214 642
Large diﬀerence in birth rates: βS = 1.2 > 0.3 = βR and γR = γS = 0.8
7 CON stt+1 100 480 490 499 509 520 530 541 551 562
7 NON rtt+1 400 30 31 31 32 32 33 34 34 35
Table 5: Equilibrium religious aﬃliations for generations 1–9 under network-based preferences, assuming
that s0 = 100 and r0 = 400. Expectation formation: CON: All conformists adhere/conver to.
NON: All nonconformists adhere/convert to. MIX: Expectations change (ﬂip) each period.
that religion S is always the dominating religion, despite the head start of religion R. Equilib-
rium #2 is computed under the polar expectations where religion S dominates. Equilibrium #3
demonstrates a ﬂip of expectations among generations, where people belonging to odd gener-
ations expect S to be the largest religion whereas those belonging to even generations expect
R to dominate. Clearly, there is a large number of equilibria associated with diﬀerent types of
changing expectations.
The equilibria 1–3 correspond to identical birth and conformity rates among the two religions.
For this reason, the aggregate population size does not vary among these equilibria. This suggest
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that Table 5 omits the trivial class of equilibria where both religions are adhered to by exactly 50%
of the total population so that stt+1 = r
t
t+1 for all t = 1, 2, . . .. Of course, this type of equilibria
can be ruled out on the basis of being Pareto dominated by unevenly-distributed allocations
of believers where conformists adhere to the largest denomination while nonconformists to the
smallest one.
The equilibria 4–6 correspond to equilibria 1–3 but are computed for unequal birth rates,
where we assume that an S-aﬃliated parent has more children than an R-aﬃliated parent. The
self-fulﬁlling expectation about the dominance of each religion are the same as in equilibria 1–
3. The aggregate population size, however, varies among the equilibria due to the diﬀerence
in the number of oﬀsprings between the religions. Equilibrium #7 demonstrates that when the
diﬀerence in birth rates is signiﬁcant (in this example, R parents bring less oﬀsprings than the
previous generation) the equilibrium becomes unique where all the conformists adhere or convert
to S. Finally, the case which is presented in Table 4 where diﬀerent religions generate diﬀerent
conformity and nonconformity rates is omitted from Table 5. Simulations conﬁrm as with the
diﬀerent birth rates case, that all equilibria exist for small diﬀerences, but become unique as the
diﬀerence between γS and γR is enlarged.
7. Concluding Comments
This paper analyzes the dynamics behind the “demand” for secular and religious aﬃliations. For
this reason, this paper develops and presents models of religious retention across generations,
allowing for dynamic switching between secular and religious aﬃliations. The conversion patterns
are shown to depend on diﬀerences in birth rates, and more importantly, diﬀerent attitudes
towards conformism and nonconformism.
Section 3 endogenizes the (non)conformity rates by introducing parents who are concerned
with the probability that their children will convert against their own belief. In doing so, the
role of the church becomes to generate a positive externality in church education that promotes
conformity. Section 3 can be extended to endogenize also the fertility rates as inﬂuenced by
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the teaching of the church. For example, some churches preach against birth control, and some
encourage large families. If we assume that the teaching of a religion is endogenous with the
religion’s status in society, then such factors as being a minority could aﬀect the group’s doctrine
on fertility, and in turn aﬀecting the birth rate.
The models presented in this paper can be used to simulate two types of communities. (a) The
transition between secular and religious groups. Under this interpretation, conversion means that
a young who is born secular becomes religious, and vice versa. (b) The transition between two
diﬀerent religions. Under this interpretation, there are no secular people, and all individuals must
be aﬃliated with one religion. Under the second interpretation, we can also model the transition
between two streams or subreligions within the same religion. For example, conversions between
Orthodox and Reform streams of Judaism, between Catholics and Protestants, and the Sunni
and Shiites streams of Islam.
The data provided in the introductory section clearly displays an increase in the percentage
of secular people, where now atheists are around 2.5% of the worldwide population and other
nonreligious constitute about 12.7% worldwide, for 236 countries (see also the 2001 Britannica
Book of the Year). Table 1 predicts some increase in these rates for North and Latin America, but
a decline for Europe and Asia. This clearly indicates that there is a complete uncertainty whether
the ongoing secularization trends will continue. Indeed, well-enforced governmental guarantees of
religious freedom might have contributed to the increase of both the level of participation among
the religious while at the same time increasing the number of people willing to admit that they
are secular.
Finally, I would like to end this paper with a short motivation for the “network” approach
examined in Subsection 6.2. In fact my interest in religion economics, Shy (2001, Ch.11), started
from asking the question why conversion to Judaism (at least they way it is done in Israel), is
much more diﬃcult or time consuming than conversion to other much larger religions, where
only taking a communion or being baptized are needed? In fact, if Judaism is on a decline, then
network economics (or simple marketing intuition) tells us that Jews should “lower the standards”
with respect to requirements for conversion to Judaism (say, as Reform Jews practice to some
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degree). The only, perhaps unsatisfactory, explanation that I found so far is the negative network
eﬀect, also called vanity eﬀect, where some believers prefer to be aﬃliated with smaller religions
or cults, than with the world’s dominating religions. This can be accomplished by toughening
the requirements from outsiders who want to convert. Of course, smaller groups also have the
advantage of generating “public goods” in the form of trust among members, by threatening to
expel deviants from the community.
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